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ACCESS TO JUSTICE
FOR UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Sande L. Buhai*
The problem of access to justice is one that affects the ordinary
American who cannot afford an attorney and is disqualified from
receiving free legal aid, and thus must rely on self-representation in
court. But, the unrepresented litigant often does not stand a chance
against the represented litigant. Herein lies the problem-unequal
access to justice. Self-help centers, alternative dispute resolution
options, and the unbundling of legal services have not adequately
addressed this problem. Judges may be able to help unrepresented
litigants, but under the American adversarial system of justice,
stringent limitations on judicial activism prohibit such interference. In
contrast, in many civil law countries, the legal system and the role of
the judge are construeddifferently, resulting in greateraccess to justice
for ordinary citizens. There are aspects of the civil law system that the
American system may borrow in its effort to expand access tojusticefor
all.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the United States, individuals of ordinary means often cannot
effectively access the legal system because they cannot afford to hire
private counsel but make too much money to qualify for assistance
from legal service organizations.' Individuals who may qualify
* Clinical Professor, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. The author has served as a Judge
Pro Tern in both Small Claims and Traffic Court. She would like to thank Professor John T.
Nockleby for his hard work in setting up this wonderful symposium and his ongoing support for
public interest throughout the years. She would also like to thank Loyola Law School for its
strong support of scholarship.
1. Legal aid is available to those whose income falls below 125 percent of the Federal
Poverty Income Guidelines. This is not to suggest that persons who qualify for legal services are
able to access the justice system in a meaningful way. A lot has been written about the need for
increased legal services for the poor. In 1998, about 44.5 million Americans were eligible for
services, and under 3,500 attorneys were available to help them, according to a study by the Legal
Services Corporation. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., SERVING THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOWINCOME AMERICANS: A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000).
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financially for assistance from legal services organizations often face
similar problems when they do not actually receive such assistance
due to the organizations' funding limitations. Attempts to solve this
problem-self-help centers, the unbundling of legal services, and
alternative dispute resolution-are generally perceived to have been
only partially successful. This Article explores why the problem
remains so widespread in the United States and looks to other
countries for possible solutions. In particular, this Article compares
access to justice for individuals of ordinary means under the
American adversarial system with access under the civil law
inquisitorial system, examining the different roles of judges in the
two systems and their ability, training, and inclination to handle
cases involving unrepresented litigants in ways more likely to
produce justice for all.
The great legal character Atticus Finch said, "Our courts have
their faults, as does any human institution, but in this country our
courts are the great levelers, and in our courts all men are created
equal." 2 Like Atticus Finch, I am not an idealist. Courts are great
levelers, but only if ordinary folk have access to them. Access to
justice is a multidimensional problem. This Article focuses on one
small part: what happens when unrepresented ordinary people,
neither rich nor poor, attempt to use the justice system to solve their
problems or are forced to deal with that system against their will.
In particular, this Article examines the role of judges in the
system. A judge-centered approach to ensuring access to justice was
initially suggested in an essay by Russell G. Pearce titled Redressing
Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will
Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges
Will Help.3 Russell Engler and Richard Zorza have similarly argued
that judges have the ultimate responsibility to ensure that justice is
served. 4 Engler, in particular, has urged that judges should consider
it part of their jobs to "assist the unrepresented litigant in developing
a full, factual record, and to help the litigant with matters of
2. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 218 (1960).
3. Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to
Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 969, 977-78 (2004) (proposing that making judges "active umpires" would be
an important step in the search for access to justice).
4. Id. at 976.
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procedure and substantive law." 5 His suggestion, made over ten
years ago, has not yet had the kind of impact he clearly would have
liked.
Part II of this Article briefly describes relevant aspects of the
American adversarial system, the problem of access to that system,
and some of the remedial measures that have been attempted. It then
looks at the role of judges-including their training, experience, and
actions-in implementing this system. Part III undertakes a similar
examination of the civil law inquisitorial system.6 Part IV explores
how our system might profitably borrow from the civil law system to
assure more effective access to justice for ordinary Americans-the
people our government is, in theory, supposed to serve.
Change is difficult, but our system is far from ideal. We can
change, and we must do a better job of bringing access to justice to
all.
II. AMERICAN-STYLE JUSTICE
A. The AdversarialSystem

Over 100 years ago, Roscoe Pound wrote that the American
legal system reflected a "sporting theory of justice." 7 Under such a
theory, civil litigation consists of private brawlers fighting things out
with a judge serving simply as a referee. Judge Kevin Burke
observed that this paradigm is "so rooted in the legal profession in
America that many of us take it for a fundamental legal tenet." 8 He
went on to observe, quite rightly, that the paradigm leads even "the
most conscientious judge to believe that he or she is merely to decide
the contest, as attorneys present it, according to the rules of the
game, and not to search independently for truth and justice."9 Ellen
Seward agreed that "[t]he adversary system is characterized by party
5. Russell Engler, And Justicefor All-Including the UnrepresentedPoor: Revisiting the
Roles of the Judges, Mediatorsand Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2029 (1999).

6. As has been noted by others, the term "inquisitorial system" raises the specter of a
frightening sort of Spanish Inquisition and is in part responsible for the instant American distrust
of the civil law approach.
7. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration ofJustice,

29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 241, 273-91 (1964).
8. Kevin S. Burke, A Judiciary That Is as Good as Its Promise: The Best Strategy for
PreservingJudicial Independence,41 CT. REV. 4, 6 (2004).

9. Id.
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control of the investigation and presentation of evidence and
argument, and by a passive decision maker who merely listens to
both sides and renders a decision based on what she has heard." "0
Our adversarial system has been defended on two principal
grounds: (1) that it is the best way to arrive at the truth; and (2) that it
best protects individual autonomy and dignity. " An intensely
individualistic style of adjudication also fits nicely with our strongly
individualistic society. Supporters of adversarial systems argue that
because the parties have control, each party has a strong motivation
to present its best possible case. Judges who know nothing about the
cases are perceived as being more impartial. If judges undertake
their own investigations, it is arguable that they may make up their
minds too early in the process. On the other hand, the adversarial
system expects parties to be selfish in their arguments, creates
incentives to hide evidence, and rewards parties whose attorneys are
the most skilled and well-funded. 2
There has been much criticism of our system in the years since
Roscoe Pound made his observations, but little has changed.
Supporters of the American system continue to point to the need for
impartial judges, unbiased by their own factual investigations or
interest in the outcome. '" In the meantime, however, empirical
research has cast doubt on the premise that judges are really
unbiased, suggesting that what is really at stake is only the
appearance of impartiality. 14 In addition, it has come to be
appreciated that in the inquisitorial system, decision makers are
expected to be impartial as well, deciding the case on the facts and
the law, not on extraneous factors. "5Judges who are willing to help
both sides, as needed, do not necessarily have to be perceived as
biased. 16 Passivity and impartiality are not the same thing.

10. Ellen Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J.
301,302 (1989).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 313.
13. Id. at 308-09.
14.

See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE

151-56(1949).
15. Sward, supra note 10, at 314.
16. Engler, supra note 5, at 2030.
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B. Problemswith Access and Attempted Remedies
A great deal of attention has been given to the problem of
providing equal access to justice for low-income individuals and
families. Many middle-income individuals and families, however,
face similar problems securing such access. "7A 1994 American Bar
Association report found almost no difference in the problems lowand middle-income individuals have in securing access to justice,
with an increasing number of middle-income individuals choosing to
resolve their legal issues without the help of a lawyer. 18
The self-represented litigant is widely perceived as being both a
cause and a casualty of problems in the judicial system. Observers
often blame such litigants for many of the delays and inefficiencies
that congest the courts and deplete scarce resources. "9Research has
shown that litigants who represent themselves are indeed more likely
to neglect time limits and miss court deadlines. 20
The increase in self-represented litigants is not limited to the
United States. Other common law jurisdictions have experienced
similar trends. In Hong Kong, for example, although precise
numbers are unavailable, the increase is perceived to be significant.21
The concern has been voiced in all major common law jurisdictions,
including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand. 22

The rise of pro se litigants has been seen as a "sign of system
breakdown,"23 the implication being that the system needs more--or
less expensive-lawyers.
We should consider the possibility,

17. In 1999, the median household income was $40,816. U.S. Census Bureau Historical
Income Tables-Households, Table H-6: Regions-All Races by Median and Mean Income,

http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h06AR.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). The
U.S. Census Bureau defined the "middle class" as having an annual household income between
$17,000 and $79,000. THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN
87 (2004) (defining the middle class as the middle 60 percent of income earners).
18. See Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A
Survey of Americans: Major Findings from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study (1994),
availableat http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.pdf.
19. Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 384 (2005).
20. Id.
21. Camille Cameron & Elsa Kelly, Litigants in Person in Civil Proceedings: Part I, 32
H.K. L.J. 313, 313 (2002).
22. Id. at315.
23. Melinda Buckley, The Legal Aid Crises: Time for Action 45 (June 2000),
http://www.eba.org/CBA/Advocacy/pdf/Paper.pdf.
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however, that a system that only works when every party is
represented by competent and equal counsel is not a system worth
saving.
Regardless, it is clear that a lack of legal assistance places the
pro se litigant at a fundamental disadvantage and effectively limits
his or her access to justice. An extensive recent survey confirmed
these disadvantages, noting that pro se litigants had greater difficulty,
not only in understanding and applying the finer points of the
substantive law, but even in conceptualizing the key claims or
defenses of their cases.24 Another survey found that self-represented
litigants were often less effective in adducing evidence and in
articulating their positions. 25 In all, more than 86 percent of pro se
litigants suffered a problem in forming or arguing their case. 26
In a study of lawsuits seeking protective orders in Baltimore,
Professor Jane C. Murphy found that women represented by lawyers
had an 83 percent chance of getting such orders, compared to only 32
percent of unrepresented women.27 An investigation of litigation in
New York City's Housing Court found that an unrepresented tenant
had a 28 percent likelihood of defaulting, compared to the 16 percent
chance of default by a tenant represented by counsel. 28 Final
judgments were entered more than twice as often against those who
were unrepresented: 51 percent against unrepresented tenants, as
opposed to 22 percent against those with counsel. 29
Arcane procedural rules, perhaps defensible if both parties are
represented by advocates experienced in such rules, often augment
this disadvantage. 3 ° Indeed, in the classic adversarial model, it

24. See generally RICHARD MOORHEAD & MARK SEFTON, LITIGANTS IN PERSON:
UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN FIRST INSTANCE PROCEEDINGS

153-80 (2005), available at

http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/research/pubs/repository/1221.pdf (discussing various issues facing pro
se litigants in English courts).
25. Paul Lewis, Litigants in Person and Their Difficulties in Adducing Evidence: A Study of
Small Claims in an English County Court, 11 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 24, 26 (2007).
26. Id. at 32.
27. Jane C. Murphy, Engaging the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to
ProtectBattered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 499, 511-12 (2003).
28. Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomesfor Poor Tenants in New
York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 419,
426-27 (2001).
29. Id. at 419.
30. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After Legal Aid Is Abolished, 2 J. INST. FOR THE STUDY OF
LEGAL ETHICS 375, 378-82 (1999).
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sometimes seems more important for a judge to enforce procedural
rules than to enforce the substantive law. 3,
Attempts within the adversarial system to alleviate problems
faced and caused by the pro se litigant in civil cases fall into three
principal categories: (1) expanding the availability of attorneys; (2)
altering the system itself to make it less dependent upon attorneys
and more accessible to pro se litigants; and (3) preparing individuals
to better represent themselves. 32 Such attempts have included small
claims courts, community courts, mediation and arbitration, self-help
centers, and the unbundling of legal services.
1. Expanding the Availability of Attorneys
Reforms within the first category---expanding attorney
availability--do not significantly aid the litigant who appears pro se
by choice. They do, however, provide relief for at least some who
appear unrepresented solely because they cannot afford legal fees. 13
Moreover, expanding the availability of attorneys may arguably be
the most effective reform in assisting those who thereby can obtain
competent representation, since it may do the most to level the
playing field. In contrast, reforms in the second and third categories
may make the system more user-friendly but continue to leave an
unrepresented party facing a represented opponent at a disadvantage,
especially in an adversarial system.
One overriding concern has been the possibility that justice is
meted out unequally according to the parties' relative wealth or
income. Notably, one study in the United States found that a
majority of all pro se litigants proceeded without legal assistance due

31. See id. at 383-84.
32. Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The Problem of Navigating the
System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2002). The Tennessee Supreme
Court launched the most recent "Access to Justice" campaign with a public meeting. Some of the
problems and suggestions in the meeting included the need for more education about legal issues
and availability of more information to people who represent themselves in court. The group also
discussed the shortage of lawyers in rural areas and the possibility of requiring all lawyers to take
on at least some pro bono cases every year. General Sessions Judge Hugh Harvey said he thinks
high schools should teach classes on contracts and basic legal issues. Judge Harvey stated: "Most
of the people that come to my courtroom don't understand very basic legal issues. . . . By
teaching them about collections law, we could head them off before they come to court."
Mariann Martin, Campaign Seeks to BringLegal Services to State's Poor,JACKSON SUN (Tenn.),
Jan. 22, 2009, at 1.
33. See Swank, supra note 19, at 378.
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to financial constraints. " As a result, many reforms have focused on
providing more attorney assistance.
Bar associations, in particular, have focused a great deal of
energy and effort on providing pro bono legal services. Pro bono
representation has helped many pro se litigants and has effected real
systemic change in many contexts. It is, however, clearly inadequate
to address the problem as a whole.
A second approach-known as "civil Gideon"-hasbeen to urge
that a right to counsel be recognized in at least some civil cases. But,
the U.S. Supreme Court held in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services of North Carolina " that constitutional due process does not
create a right to counsel in civil cases, even when an individual's
parental rights are at stake. 36 Only a handful of states provide a right
to counsel in their state constitution or by statute. Generally, this
right is limited to circumstances related to parental rights. "
Attempts to establish a right to representation in civil matters are
ongoing. Two amicus briefs filed by retired judges in Washington
and Alaska outline the serious consequences of the lack of
representation in our adversarial civil justice system. 38 They argue
that, at its most basic level, the "impact of a lawyer is an impact on
winning."39
Indeed, Rebecca L. Sandefur, a noted Stanford
University sociologist, concluded that "a litigant with a lawyer is five
times more likely to succeed than someone who is selfrepresented." 40
Limited-scope representation, or unbundling, occurs when a
client hires an attorney for help with only specific portions of a legal
problem, such as legal advice, document review, or limited
34. Id. at 378 n.44.
35. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
36. Id. at 32-33.
37. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the
United States and OtherIndustrialDemocracies,24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S83, S87 (2000).
38. Brief Amicus Curiae of Retired Washington Judges in Support of Appellant at 4, King v.
King, No. 57831-6-I (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/
a6906665ac25a77b80_yrm6by9qg.pdf; Brief of Retired Alaska Judges as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellee Jonsson at 2, Office of Public Advocacy v. Alaska Court System, No. S12999 (Alaska Nov. 19, 2008), available at http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/Alaska%
20Retired%20Judges%20Amicus%2OBrief.PDF.
39. Brief of Retired Alaska Judges, supra note 38, at 20; accord Brief Amicus Curiae of
Retired Washington Judges, supra note 38.
40. Brief of Retired Alaska Judges, supra note 38, at 14.
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appearance. 1 The client then represents himself or herself in all
other regards. Unbundling is seen as an attractive alternative for
clients who may not have the means to pay for complete
representation, especially when the legal issue is relatively
uncomplicated. 12 For example, the California Rules of Court
specifically allow an attorney to prepare documents for a client
without disclosing his or her identity in the documents or appearing
in court on behalf of the client. 4"

However, unbundling poses serious ethical issues for lawyers
willing to attempt to provide such services. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct require competence 44 and diligence45 when a
lawyer represents a client. While Model Rule 1.2 allows a lawyer to
limit the scope of his or her representation, such a limitation must be
reasonable under the circumstances, and the lawyer must always be
competent to handle the matter.4 6 Several state bar associations have
set forth guidelines for lawyers involved in limited-scope
representation, providing advice on how best to represent clients
while fulfilling their ethical duties. For example, the California
Commission on Access to Justice has stated that the client must give
written informed consent to the limited-scope representation,
changes in scope of representation must be documented, and the
lawyer has an affirmative duty to advise the client on matters related
to the representation, even if not asked. "
Unbundling is only a limited and partial solution. First, it is
most helpful in less complex matters, such as family law and
probate; it is unlikely to be helpful in matters involving personal
injury or medical malpractice, for example. Second, if potential
clients do not know that unbundling is an option, they will not even
consider consulting an attorney before going to court. Finally, even
with the reduced cost, the price of legal services may still be too
prohibitive for many middle-income litigants. This is especially true
41. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FAMILY LAW LIMITED SCOPE
REPRESENTATION: RISK MANAGEMENT MATERIALS 8 (2004).

42. See Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and ModerateIncome Elderly Clients, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 336-37 (1997).
43. Cal. R. Ct. 5.70(a) (2007).

44.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.1 (2009).

45. Id. R. 1.3.
46. Id. R. 1.2.
47. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 10.
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if the issues involved are complex and require more time and
consultation.
The California Bar Association has noted several situations in
which a lawyer should be cautious about agreeing to represent a
client on a limited-scope basis. First, a lawyer should avoid agreeing
to limited-scope representation in matters implicating areas of law
with which the lawyer is not familiar, even if the limited-scope
representation itself is within the lawyer's expertise. 48 This is
because the lawyer remains subject to the duty to advise the client of
important matters outside the scope of the agreed-upon
representation.
Second, unbundling may not be appropriate for all clients.
Limited-capacity clients, for example, may not be able to give
informed consent before agreeing to limited-scope representation.
Similarly, a client who is a victim of domestic violence may not
benefit from unbundling in a case involving the batterer because the
client may not be able to handle the portions of the case in which she
remains unrepresented.49
Third, the California Bar Association urges lawyers to be
especially wary of clients who take a "musical chairs" approach to
legal representation °--clients who involve multiple lawyers in
Multiple
different aspects of the same unbundled case.
uncoordinated representation is obviously problematic. A client who
consults multiple lawyers on a limited-scope basis may place each
lawyer in an ethically awkward position. This may also, of course,
indicate that the client has a difficult or controversial case-one that
limited-scope representation is particularly unsuited to resolve.51 For
this reason, a lawyer should only agree to limited-scope
representation after a detailed intake interview and careful
questioning of his or her client's motives and goals.
Finally, lawyers remain responsible for ensuring that the scope
of their representation is reasonable. 52 This may include advising the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.at 12.
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client to seek other counsel or advising him or her that the lawyer
cannot work on the case from beginning to end. "
Unbundling creates its own set of problems as well. Lawyers
are trained in the ethics of full representation; lawyers undertaking
limited-scope representation may fail to fulfill their ethical
obligations, either intentionally or unintentionally, and therefore may
cause more harm than good.54 This is particularly problematic
where, as is likely, the lawyer represents clients unfamiliar with the
legal system---clients who may have no way of knowing whether
their lawyer is engaging in unethical or illegal behavior. Some
clients may also find unbundled legal services convenient in the
beginning, but come to a point where they realize they cannot
proceed through the rest of the case without more help, and yet still
not have the resources to pay for that help.55 Finally, even if
unbundling opens access to the legal system to some clients, it may
have negative systemic effects. 5 6 Unbundled representation of
tenants, for example, would have been unlikely to produce an
implied warranty of habitability benefiting tenants on a general level
because there would be no overall assessment of any systemic
problems.
2. Making the System More Accessible to Pro Se Litigants
A second category of attempts to alleviate the problems faced or
created by unrepresented litigants involves altering the system itself
to make it less dependent upon attorneys and more accessible to pro
se parties. Examples include community courts, small claims courts,
and mediation services. The New York State Unified Court System,
for example, includes seven community courts.57 Community courts
typically address problems that might otherwise be resolved by
traditional courts-landlord-tenant disputes, domestic violence,
juvenile delinquency, and quality-of-life offenses like prostitution,

53. See id.
54. See, e.g., McNeal, supra note 42, at 318-30 (illustrating the ethical issues associated
with unbundled representation).
55. See id. at 335.
56. See id. at 334.
57. Problem-Solving Courts, Community Courts Locations, New York State Unified Court
Systems, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem-solving/cc/courts.shtml (last visited Sept. 5,
2009).
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graffiti, and shoplifting 5 -by bringing together elements of the
justice system, citizen action, and community service programs. 59 In
criminal matters, such courts typically impose nontraditional
sentences, like community service or drug treatment, 6" and make
other services available to help individuals break the cycle of crime,
including job training and placement, drug treatment, and
homelessness outreach.6 1
A study of the nation's first community court, the Midtown
Community Court in Manhattan, suggested that the court was
successful in reducing crime and improving the safety of the
surrounding community. 62 After the court opened, prostitution
arrests fell by 56 percent, and illegal vending arrests fell by 24
percent. 63 The study also found the community court had saved the
traditional court system $1.3 million annually since its creation.64
Since the creation of the Midtown Community Court in 1993, over
thirty other community courts have opened across the United
States. 65
Many state court systems also include small claims courts.
California, for example, allows claims for less than $7,500 to be
brought in small claims court.66 An individual must be mentally
competent and either eighteen years old or an emancipated minor in
order to bring such a claim.6 7 If an individual is not mentally
competent, the court appoints a guardian ad litem to represent him.6t
Nevertheless, lawyers are not allowed to represent either party during
the proceedings themselves.
Filing fees range from $30 to $75,
69

58. See id.
59. See The Center for Court Innovation, Community Court, http://www.courtinnovation.org
(follow "Community Court" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
60. See Problem-Solving Courts, supra note 57.
61. Id.
62. See DANA KRALSTEIN, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION,
RESEARCH: A LITERATURE REVIEW 3 (2005).

COMMUNITY

COURT

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The Center for Court Innovation, supra note 59.
66. California Courts, Self-Help Center: Small Claims, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
selfhelp/smallclaims/scbasics.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
67. Id.

68. Id.
69. Id.
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depending on the size of the claim. 0 If the losing party did not file
the original claim, he or she can file an appeal, with a $75 fee, within
thirty days of the judgment. 7 Lawyers can typically represent the
parties on appeal. 72

Mediation is another way of attempting to make the court
system less dependent on attorneys and more accessible to pro se
parties.
Two current examples of court-sponsored mediation
services are those provided by Santa Barbara County Superior Court
Family Mediation Services 3 and the Crown Heights Community
Mediation Center in Brooklyn, New York. 7

Family mediation

services at the Santa Barbara courts are provided free of charge for
individuals dealing with child custody and visitation disputes.7 5
Mediation results are confidential, and the mediator will only make a
recommendation to the court if both parties agree in advance.7 6
Additionally, the courts offer free child custody and visitation
classes. 7
The Crown Heights Community Mediation Center provides a
wide range of services beyond those offered through typical court
programs, including community resource guides, leadership classes,
and training on topics such as diversity, conflict resolution, and
family mediation. 7' The Center also provides facilitation services to
bring together community members to discuss common problems.
One such initiative, for example, involved bringing together local
criminal justice agencies, faith-based organizations, and residents to
discuss possible solutions to gun violence and crime prevention. 9
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Santa Barbara County Superior Court, Family Mediation Services, http://www.sb
courts.org/speciaLprograms/fam-med.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
74. The Center for Court Innovation, Crown Heights Community Mediation Center,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfin?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=601 &currentTo
pTier2=true (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
75. Santa Barbara County Superior Court, supra note 73.
76. Id.
77. Santa Barbara County Superior Court, Free Family Law Classes, http://www.sb
courts.org/speciaLprograms/fam law classes.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
78. The Center for Court Innovation, Crown Heights Trainings, http://www.court
innovation.org/index.cfin?fuseaction=page.viewPage&pagelD=655&nodelD=l (last visited Sept.
5, 2009).
79. Id.
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Another program, Youth Court, aims to use positive peer pressure to
encourage young people to make better choices. 80 Youth Court
trains local teens to be judges, jurors, and advocates, who then
choose the appropriate sanctions or punishments for other teens who
have admitted responsibility for school infractions or low-level
criminal offenses. " The emphasis of this program is on community
82
restoration and helping teens escape a cycle of crime.
3. Preparing Pro Se Litigants for Better Self-Representation
A final approach to alleviating problems faced by-and caused
by-pro se litigants consists of preparing individuals to better
represent themselves. This may include providing self-help centers,
education, and advocacy training. Many courts now have facilities to
assist unrepresented people in filling out forms and to help them
understand the civil justice process. Examples include the Family
Law Information Center ("FLIC") within the Los Angeles Superior
Court system 3 and CourtHelp within the New York State court
system. 84

FLIC is available to any litigant not currently represented by a
lawyer. The program assists litigants with a variety of family law
issues, including marital dissolutions, legal separations, annulments,
summary dissolutions, paternity lawsuits, and domestic violence
prevention cases. 85 Members of the FLIC staff are available to
answer questions about court processes, court rules, and the
preparation of court documents. The program also provides free
informational videos, access to the Internet and reference materials,
and referrals to Family Court Services, the District Attorney's
Office, the Office of the Family Law Facilitator, various nonprofit
family law organizations, guardianship clinics, and other community
agencies. 86

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Los Angeles County Superior Court, Family Law: Self Help, http://www.lasuperior
court.org/familylaw/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
84. New York CourtHelp, A Website for Unrepresented New Yorkers, http://www.cour
ts.state.ny.us/courthelp/index.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
85. Los Angeles County Superior Court, supra note 83.
86. Id.
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CourtHelp is an online project of the New York State Unified
Court System. The Web site includes information about the law,
court facts, free court forms, and links to lawyer referral services. 7
The section titled "Court Facts" includes information on courthouse
locations, their hours of operation, where to go to find help within
the courthouse, which courts handle certain issues such as family law
or probate, and contact information for court managers. 8 CourtHelp
also provides answers to frequently asked questions on a variety of
legal issues, including housing, family law, criminal matters, and
small claims. 89 The Web site also has a glossary of common legal
terms and links to local law libraries."9 All court forms are available
for download from the Web site. Finally, the Web site includes links
to lawyer referral services by county. "
It is not clear, however, that this self-help system has any
beneficial effect on outcomes for pro se litigants. A recent study
showed that unrepresented litigants who sought help at a self-help
center were just as likely to lose their cases as those who did not seek
such help. 92
C. The Role of Judges in the American System
Unlike civil law judges, American judges are, first and foremost,
lawyers. Almost all judges in the United States have first practiced
as lawyers, generally for many years. In law school, judges study to
be lawyers, not judges. Indeed, most law schools in the United
States make no attempts to prepare their students to serve on the
bench. The process by which American judges are chosen does little
to remedy this problem: American judges are either popularly elected
or appointed by popularly elected executives who may have no legal
training themselves and are not part of the judicial branch.

87. New York CourtHelp, supra note 84.
88. New York CourtHelp, Court Facts, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courthelp/cfactsl.html
(last visited Sept. 5, 2009).

89. Id.
90. New York CourtHelp, The Law, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courthelp/thelaw2.html
(last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
91. New York CourtHelp, Lawyers, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courthelp/lawyers.html
(last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
92. Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: Beyond Perceived Justicefor Individuals, 42
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 913,919-20 (2009).
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It is only once they have been elected or appointed that most
judges begin their training. Many states have their own judicial
training courses, but these are typically quite modest. 93
In
California, for example, newly selected judges attend two programs
totaling only three weeks of training.94 The first week is an
orientation presented by the California Judicial Education and
Research Association, which focuses mostly on attitude, fairness,
and judicial temperament. A new judge then attends the State
Judicial College, a two-week training course that covers more
substantive areas of law. 9' And that is that. The new judge then
ascends the bench and begins refereeing procedural and substantive
fights between other lawyers.
American judges can, of course, obtain further training. They
are encouraged to attend continuing legal education programs and
are trained separately whenever they receive a new assignment. 96
Most importantly, the National Judicial College in Nevada offers
graduate programs in judicial studies, with more than 2,500 judges
enrolled from all fifty states, all U.S. territories, and more than 150
countries. 9' To place this number in context, the United States has a
total of about 51,000 judges, magistrates, and others performing
similar judicial functions. 98 Although this graduate program is an
extremely valuable asset to judicial preparedness, judges generally
are not required to attend the program to be appointed to the bench or
to continue serving in their judicial capacity.
Perhaps because they are trained primarily as lawyers and not as
judges, American judges tend to view their role as that of a neutral
and impartial referee, consistent with the sporting theory of justice.
They perceive their main job to be procedural-to ensure that the

93. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2008-2009
EDITION, JUDGES, MAGISTRATES AND OTHER JUDICIAL WORKERS,
Dec. 18, 2007,

http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos272.htn.
94. Interview with Hon. Richard Fruin, Judge, Cal. Superior Court, in L.A., Cal. (Feb 3,
2009).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The National Judicial College, The NJC Experience, http://www.judges.org/about.htm
(last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
98. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 93.
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adversary system, quintessentially a contest between lawyers,
operates efficiently and effectively. 9
The formal rules that govern judicial behavior do nothing to
change this mindset. American judges are subject to codes of
conduct adopted by their respective states. Most of these codes are
based on the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (the "Model Code"). ' Canon 2 of the Model Code says
simply that "a judge shall perform the duties of judicial office
impartially, competently, and diligently." ' Rule 2.2 of the Model
Code says that "a judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall
perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially." 102 The
opening sentence of the preamble to the Washington State Code of
Judicial Conduct similarly states: "Our legal system is based upon
the principle that an independent, fair, and competent judiciary will
interpret and apply the laws that govern us." 03 But exactly what role
is this "independent, fair, and competent judiciary" supposed to play
in the context of an adversary system?
One thing is clear: the judge sets the standard for courtroom
behavior. This responsibility requires the judge, among other things,
to appear completely impartial in the presence of the jurors. 104
Because the jurors look to the judge as a model, they are also likely
to look to the judge for clues as to which side they should favor. It is
therefore vital that judges, regardless of their personal feelings, rule
strictly on the law and facts while showing as little favoritism or
undue emotion as possible. When judges exhibit contempt or bias,
they stray from their position as neutral umpires and can affect
outcomes in a way the adversary system does not intend. 05
An overly combative or poorly trained attorney can severely
strain a judge's ability to remain neutral. 106 Even if an attorney
harms rather than helps his or her client's case, the assigned judge
must only intervene as may be necessary to avoid an egregious

99. Interview with Hon. Richard Fruin, supra note 94.
100. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. Canon2.
Id. R. 2.2.
WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1995).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2007).
Id. R. 2.3.
Id. R. 2.15 cmts. 1 & 2.
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outcome. In any event, the judge must undertake any such
intervention so as to minimize its impact on the jury's opinion of the
lawyer and his or her case. Judges are instructed to call a recess and
physically leave the bench if they become so frustrated that they can
no longer rule or comment without risking being perceived as
biased. 107
Pro se litigants can present an even greater challenge. On the
one hand, many judges do value the goal of universal access to
justice. That goal would be frustrated if pro se litigants were denied
the outcome to which they are entitled as a matter of law solely
because they are not familiar with the complexities of adversarial
procedure. As a result, judges sometimes give pro se litigants
leeway as to the formalities of in-court mechanics, such as
addressing the judge and approaching the bench. ,08 Paperwork
submitted by self-represented litigants is subject to a different
standard of judicial review than paperwork submitted by lawyers. In
general, courts will construe pro se filings as liberally as possible in
favor of the litigant, searching them for any statement that could
constitute a meritorious claim or defense. 109 Judges may even go so
far as to read back pro se litigants' own questions to them on direct
examination. 110
In addition, judges sometimes handle pro se litigants with
particular solicitude to preserve the legitimacy of the system they are
charged with administering. Becoming a pro se litigant is often the
only way ordinary folk experience the legal world firsthand, short of
going to law school and passing the bar. " Judges are therefore
motivated to ensure that pro se litigants are at least treated with
respect. 11

107. Id. R. 2.3.
108. Id. R. 2.2 cmt. 4.
109. Jona Goldschmidt, Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants: Lessons from the
Canadian Experience, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 601 (2009) (citations omitted).
110. See generally Miller v. L.A. County Bd. of Educ., 799 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that allowing a pro se plaintiff to submit his direct examination questions in advance was not a
violation of his due process rights).
11t. See generally Goldschmidt, supra note 109 (providing a general overview of the pro se
litigation experience).
112. Interview with Hon. John R. Hickman, Judge, Wash. Superior Court, in Tacoma, Wash.
(Dec. 23, 2008).
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On the other hand, any special treatment for pro se litigants can
be perceived as a violation of a judge's neutral role. American
judges will therefore commonly inform a pro se litigant at the outset
that they cannot give them legal advice. A judge may go out of his
or her way to make clear to pro se litigants that as a judge, he or she
is not their friend or attorney. And in general, self-represented
litigants are held to the same standard as attorneys. 113 Promulgating
a new set of forms for use in uncontested divorce and paternity cases
in New Mexico, for example, the New Mexico Supreme Court
recently approved Form 4A-201, which states: "A self-represented
person must abide by the same rules of procedure and rules of
evidence as lawyers. It is the responsibility of self-represented
parties to determine what needs to be done and to take the necessary
action." 114 Similarly, "appellate courts will not relieve a selfrepresented litigant of the consequences of a default, such as failure
to object to an instruction or ruling by the trial court." 115
Judges reconcile concessions they make to pro se litigants with
the need to maintain the appearance of impartiality by noting that it
is usually not in the interest of opposing counsel to stop the judge
from helping the pro se litigant as much as the judge properly can.
Without such solicitude, there is a danger that the jury will come to
view opposing counsel as a bully. In addition, for many attorneys,
jurors, and judges, efficiency is often an overriding concern. Judges
are therefore usually willing to grant pro se litigants continuances,
especially to permit them to secure outside counsel. Because a case
is likely to proceed much faster and more seamlessly if both parties
have representation, such continuances are often welcomed by
opposing counsel.
The rules governing judicial behavior reflect this balancing act,
all within a sporting theory of justice. The comments to Rule 2.2 of
the Model Code state:

113. See Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving SelfRepresented Litigants, 42 JUDGES' J. 16, 16 (2003).
114. Domestic Relations Forms for Self-Represented Parties: Responsibility of Self
Represented Party, Form 4A-201, N.M. STAT. ANN. app. (West 2009) (reprinting state court rules

and forms).
115.
issue).

Albrecht, supra note 113, at 20 (containing a useful collection of cases dealing with this
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[1] To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a judge
must be objective and open-minded....
[4] It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make
reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the
opportunity to have their matters fairly heard. 116
The American Judicature Society's Recommendation 7 similarly
provides that "[j]udges should assure that self-represented litigants in
the courtroom have the opportunity to meaningfully present their
case. Judges should have the authority to insure that procedural and
evidentiary rules are not used to unjustly hinder the legal interest of
self-represented litigants." 117

Other rules provide that judges shall not be biased and must use
due diligence and competence in performing their duties. "' With
regard to a judge's role in settlement negotiations, Rule 2.6 of the
Model Code states:
(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal
interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to
be heard according to law.
(B) A iudo

mnv encnurn

nnrtiesQ tn a proeo, eding nnd

their lawyers to settle matters in dispute but shall not act in
a manner that coerces any party into settlement. 119
The comments then explicitly address the issue of unrepresented
parties:
[2] The judge plays an important role in overseeing the
settlement of disputes, but should be careful that efforts to
further settlement do not undermine any party's right to be
heard according to law. The judge should keep in mind the
effect that the judge's participation in settlement
discussions may have, not only on the judge's own views of
the case, but also on the perceptions of the lawyers and the

116. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmts. 1, 4 (2007).
117. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, REVISED PRO SE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 4 (2002).

118. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3 & cmts. 1-2 (2007) (requiring judges to
refrain from bias, prejudice, or harassment, and to ensure that lawyers in proceedings before the
court act in the same manner); see also id. R. 2.4 & cmt. (discussing the requirement that judges
avoid allowing external influences to affect their judicial conduct); id. R. 2.5 & cmts. 1-4
(discussing the judicial requirements of competence and diligence).
119. Id. R. 2.6.
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parties if the case remains with the judge after settlement
efforts are unsuccessful. Among the factors that a judge
should consider when deciding upon an appropriate
settlement practice for a case are (1) whether the parties
have requested or voluntarily consented to a certain level of
participation by the judge in settlement discussions, (2)
whether the parties and their counsel are relatively
sophisticated in legal matters, (3) whether the case will be
tried by the judge or a jury, (4) whether the parties
participatewith their counsel in settlement discussions, (5)
whether any parties are unrepresentedby counsel, and (6)
whether the matter is civil or criminal.
[3] Judges must be mindful of the effect settlement
discussions can have, not only on their objectivity and
impartiality, but also on the appearance of their objectivity
and impartiality. Despite a judge's best efforts, there may
be instances when information obtained during settlement
discussions could influence a judge's decision making
during trial, and, in such instances, the judge should
consider whether disqualification may be appropriate. 20
Much more stringent limitations are placed on any role judges
might be tempted to play in factual investigation. Rule 2.9 of the
Model Code, which characterizes the problem as one of "ex parte
communications," provides:
(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte
communications, or consider other communications made
to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their
lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter, except
as follows:
(1) When circumstances require it, ex parte
or
communication
for scheduling, administrative,
emergency purposes, which does not address substantive
matters, is permitted ....
(3) A judge may consult with court staff and court
officials whose functions are to aid the judge in carrying out
the judge's adjudicative responsibilities, or with other

120. Id. cmts. 2-3 (emphases added).
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judges, provided the judge makes reasonable efforts to
avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the
record, and does not abrogate the responsibility personally
to decide the matter.
(B) If a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex
parte communication bearing upon the substance of a
matter, the judge shall make provision promptly to notify
the parties of the substance of the communication and
provide the parties with an opportunity to respond.
(C) A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter
independently, and shall consider only the evidence
presented and any facts that may properly be judicially
noticed." 121
The relevant comment explains that "[t]he prohibition against a
judge investigating the facts in a matter extends to information
available in all mediums, including electronic." 122
Characterization of independent judicial investigation as just
another form of ex parte communication reflects the extraordinary
hold the sporting model of justice has on American views of the
appropriate role of judges. 123 The commission that drafted the
Model Code viewed the judge's duty to consider only the evidence
presented by the parties to be a defining feature of the judge's role in
an adversarial system. Indeed, the commission amended the rule to
explicitly prohibit independent factual inquiries by the judge. 124
Judges are accorded only slightly greater leeway with respect to
matters of law. The maj ority view seems to be that, in general, selfrepresented litigants are to be treated no differently from attorneys. 125
In Plummer v. Reeves, 126 for example, the Texas Court of Appeals
dismissed an appeal because the pro se appellant failed to file a brief
with citations to legal authority supporting her position after several
opportunities to do so. 127 The court wrote:
121. Id. R. 2.9 (emphases added).
122. Id. cmt. 6.
123. See id. R. 2.9.
124. Id. R. 2.9 app. B, cmt. 7.
125. See Albrecht, supra note 113, at 43; see also Plummer v. Reeves, 93 S.W.3d 930, 931
(Tex.2003).
126. 93 S.W.3d 930 (Tex. 2003).
127. Id. at 931.
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Finally, as judges, we are to be neutral and unbiased
adjudicators of the dispute before us. Our being placed in
the position of conducting research to find authority
supporting legal propositions uttered by a litigant when the
litigant has opted not to search for same runs afoul of that
ideal, however. Under that circumstance, we are no longer
unbiased, but rather become an advocate for the party. 128
The premise that an unrepresented litigant has "opted" not to provide
legal citations might strike some as unrealistic. In any event,
Plummer and its kin extend the sporting theory of law to substantive
law itself. Judges, apparently, cannot even express their views with
regard to substantive law until the parties have taken their own
positions. Even then, a judge's role is that of a referee. From this
view, if an unrepresented party, through ignorance, fails to assert a
theory that might support her claim or defense, the judge cannot
appropriately consider that theory.
Rule 2.9(A) of the Model Code provides one explicit escape
hatch with respect to matters of law:
(2) A judge may obtain the written advice of a disinterested
expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the
judge, if the judge gives advance notice to the parties of the
person to be consulted and the subject matter of the advice
to be solicited, and affords the parties a reasonable
opportunity to object and respond to the notice and to the
advice received. 129
There is no evidence, however, that this escape hatch is commonly
used in cases involving unrepresented litigants.
The federal courts, together with the state courts in a few states,
have taken a somewhat different approach. So long as there is no
prejudice to the opponent, these court systems conclude that judges
can and should go out of their way to assist unrepresented
litigants. 130 Even in majority-rule jurisdictions, exceptions are more
likely to be made in cases involving prisoners or in cases in which
the self-representation seems to be unwanted.
128. Id.
129.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9.

130. Albrecht, supra note 113, at 43.
131. See, e.g., Waushara County v. Graf, 480 N.W.2d 16, 19-20 (Wis. 1992) (indicating that
Wisconsin limits the lenient approach to prisoners).
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The Second Circuit, for example, has emphasized the
importance of a more active role for the trial judge. In 1983, the
court reversed the denial of a self-represented litigant's motion to
vacate an entry of default. The court held that the trial court had
abused its discretion, stating:
Implicit in the right to self-representation is an obligation
on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to
protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of
important rights because of their lack of legal training.
While the right "does not exempt a party from compliance
with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law," it
should not be impaired by harsh application of technical
rules. Trial courts have been directed to read pro se papers
liberally and to allow amendment of pro se complaints
"fairly freely."
The court's duty is even broader in the case of apro se
defendant who finds herself in court against her will with
little time to learn the intricacies of civil procedure. 132
The court applied the same approach in Ortiz v. Cornetta,133
holding that an incarcerated prisoner's complaint should be deemed
filed at the time of initial filing, in spite of the fact that it was
returned for correction of a default and then later re-filed after the
statute of limitations had run. The court said:
At the outset, we note the general standards-some of
which have only recently emerged from both Supreme
Court and second circuit decisions-which hold a pro se
litigant to less stringent standards than those governing
lawyers. Such has long been the case with rules governing
pro se complaints, but it has only been in the past year that
courts have extended this principle to form a general
standard. Once a pro se litigant has done everything
possible to bring his action, he should not be penalized by
strict rules which might otherwise apply if he were
represented by counsel. 134

132. Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
133. 867 F.2d 146 (2d. Cir. 1989).
134. Id. at 148 (citations omitted).

Summer 2009]

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

1003

A recent California case illustrates the difficult line U.S. trial
judges are expected to walk. ' Holding that a judge must take
special care when dealing with a self-represented litigant, the
California Court of Appeal reasoned as follows:
We further note that pro per litigants are not entitled to
special exemptions from the California Rules of Court or
Code of Civil Procedure. They are, however, entitled to
treatment equal to that of a represented party. Trial judges
must acknowledge that pro per litigants often do not have
an attorney's level of knowledge about the legal system and
are more prone to misunderstanding the court's
requirements. When all parties are represented, the judge
can depend on the adversary system to keep everyone on
the straight and narrow. When one party is represented and
the other is not, the lawyer, in his or her own client's
interests, does not wish to educate the pro per. The judge
should monitor to ensure the pro per is not inadvertently
misled, either by the represented party or by the court.
While attorneys and judges commonly speak (and often
write) in legal shorthand, when a pro per is involved,
special care should be used to make sure that verbal
instructions given in court and written notices are clear and
understandable by a layperson. This is the essence of equal
and fair treatment, and it is not only important to serve the
ends of justice, but to maintain public confidence in the
judicial system.
The confusing, indeed misleading, nature of the
various orders and communications that Gamet received
from the trial court is particularly important in light of
Gamet's (involuntary) pro per status. As noted above, pro
per litigants are not entitled to any special treatment from
the courts. But that doesn't mean trial judges should be
wholly indifferent to their lack of formal legal training.
Clarity is important when parties are represented by
counsel. How much more important is it when one party
may not be familiar with the legal shorthand which is so

135.

Garnet v. Blanchard, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439 (Ct. App. 2001).
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often bandied around the courtroom or put into minute
orders?
There is no reason that a judge cannot take affirmative
steps-for example, spending a few minutes editing a letter
or minute order from the court-to make sure any
communication from the court is clear and understandable,
and does not require translation into normal-speak. Judges
are charged with ascertaining the truth, not just playing the
referee. A lawsuit is not a game, where the party with the
cleverest lawyer prevails regardless of the merits. Judges
should recognize that a pro per litigant may be prone to
misunderstanding court requirements or orders-that
happens enough with lawyers-and take at least some care
to assure their orders are plain and understandable.
Unfortunately, the careless use of jargon may have the
effect, as in the case before us, of misleading a pro per
litigant. The ultimate result is not only a miscarriage of
justice, but the undermining of confidence in the judicial
system. 136

The dissenting judge attacked the internal incoherence of the
majority's reasoning. He pointed out that the majority first asserted
that "pro per litigants are not entitled to any special treatment," '
and then set forth a list of special accommodations pro per litigants
should be given. The dissent's ultimate point was unobjectionable:
instead of handling the problem on a case-by-case basis, the court
should amend the rules to provide clear guidance as to how trial
judges should deal with self-represented litigants. 138
The American position may be extreme. Jurists in other
common law jurisdictions are not always expected to be as passive as
American judges. One survey, for example, found that English
jurists "raise[d] points of law which favoured unrepresented
litigants" when they could, "although with a certain wariness of their
position as [unbiased] adjudicators."

136. Id. at 445-46.
137. Id. at 447 (Bedsworth, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. RICHARD MOORHEAD & MARK SEFTON, LITIGANTS tN PERSON: UNREPRESENTED
LITIGANTS IN FIRST INSTANCE PROCEEDINGS 185-86 (2005).
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In a recent article, Cynthia Gray, the director of the American
Judicature Society's Center for Judicial Ethics, offers a proposed set
of best practices for cases involving self-represented litigants. 140
Other scholars have made similar efforts. '41 The ultimate question,
140. Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and Self-Represented
Litigants, 27 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 97 (2007).
141. Albrecht, supra note 113, at 18. Minnesota has developed the following protocol to be
used during hearings involving pro se litigants:
1. Verify that the party is not an attorney, understands that he or she is entitled to be
represented by an attorney and chooses to proceed pro se without an attorney.
2. Explain the process. "I will hear both sides in this matter. First I will listen to what
the Petitioner wants me to know about this case and then I will listen to what the
Respondent wants me to know about this case. I will try to give each side enough time
and opportunity to tell me their side of the case, but I must proceed in the order I
indicated. So please do not interrupt while the other party is presenting their evidence.
Everything that is said in court is written down by the court reporter and in order to
insure that the court record is accurate, only one person can talk at the same time. Wait
until the person asking a question finishes before answering and the person asking the
question should wait until the person answering the question finishes before asking the
next question."
3. Explain the elements. For example, in Order for Protection (OFP) cases: "Petitioner
is requesting an Order for Protection. An Order for Protection will be issued if
Petitioner can show that she is the victim of domestic abuse. Domestic abuse means
that she has been subject to physical harm or that she was reasonably in fear of
physical harm or that she was reasonably in fear of physical harm as a result of the
conduct or statements of the Respondent. Petitioner is requesting a Harassment
Restraining Order. A Harassment Restraining Order will be issued if Petitioner can
show that she is the victim of harassment. Harassment means that she has been subject
to repeated, intrusive, or unwanted acts, words, or gestures by the Respondent that are
intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or the privacy of the Petitioner."
4. Explain that the party bringing the action has the burden to present evidence in
support of the relief sought. For example, in OFP cases: "Because the Petitioner has
requested this order, she has to present evidence to show that a court order is needed. I
will not consider any of the statements in the Petition that has been filed in this matter.
I can only consider evidence that is presented in court today. If Petitioner is unable to
present evidence that an order is needed, then I must dismiss this action."
5. Explain the kind of evidence that may be presented. "Evidence can be in the form of
testimony from the parties, testimony from witnesses, or exhibits. Everyone who
testifies will be placed under oath and will be subject to questioning by the other party.
All exhibits must first be given an exhibit number by the court reporter and then must
be briefly described by the witness who is testifying and who can identify the exhibit.
The exhibit is then given to the other party who can look at the exhibit and let me know
any reason why I should not consider that exhibit when I decide the case. I will then
let you know whether the exhibit can be used as evidence."
6. Explain the limits on the kind of evidence that can be considered. "I have to make
my decision based upon the evidence that is admissible under the Rules of Evidence
for courts in Minnesota. If either party starts to present evidence that is not admissible,
I may stop you and tell you that I cannot consider that type of evidence. Some
examples of inadmissible evidence are hearsay and irrelevant evidence. Hearsay is a
statement by a person who is not in court as a witness: hearsay could be an oral
statement that was overheard or a written statement such as a letter or an affidavit.
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however, remains whether true access to justice is ever possible for
self-represented litigants in a courtroom based on a sporting theory
of justice. Judge Kevin Burke argues in the negative. In his view, a
more radical move towards "problem-solving courts" and
"therapeutic justice" is required to solve the problem. 142
Interestingly, his view is supported by the comments to Rule 2.9 of
the Model Code, which substantially relax prohibitions on ex parte
communications in less traditional dispute-resolution forums: "A
judge may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications
expressly authorized by law, such as when serving on therapeutic or
problem-solving courts, mental health courts, or drug courts. In this
capacity, judges may assume a more interactive role with parties,
treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and
others." "'
III.

FOREIGN LAW APPROACHES TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE

A. The Civil Law System

Nations with a civil law tradition, " by contrast, adhere to what
Americans call an "inquisitorial" model in which judges are called
upon to take a more active investigative role with the goal of
achieving substantive justice. "' In an inquisitorial system, the judge

Irrelevant evidence is testimony or exhibits that do not help me understand or decide
issues that are involved in this case."
7. Ask both parties whether they understand the process and the procedure.
8. Non-attorney advocates will be permitted to sit at counsel table with either party
and provide support but will not be permitted to argue on behalf of a party or to
question witnesses.
9. Questioning by the judge should be directed at obtaining general information to
avoid the appearance of advocacy. For example, in OFP cases: "Tell me why you
believe you need an order for protection. If you have specific incidents you want to
tell me about, start with the most recent incident first and tell me when it happened,
where it happened, who was present, and what happened."
10. Whenever possible the matter should be decided and the order prepared
immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing so it may be served on the parties.
Id. Idaho is also working on such a protocol. Id.
142. Burke, supra note 8, at 6.
143. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9 cmt. 4 (2007).
144. Civil law countries include most of Western Europe and Latin America.
145. See Leonard L. Cavise, Essay: The Transitionfrom the Inquisitorialto the Accusatorial
System of Trial Procedure: Why Some Latin American Lawyers Hesitate, 53 WAYNE L. REv. 785,

792 (2007).
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actively supervises the gathering of evidence; the judge is therefore
not a passive decision maker. 46 In Germany, as in the United States,
a lawsuit is initiated by the filing of a complaint setting forth facts,
legal theories, and remedies requested. "' Thereafter, however,
German and American procedures differ substantially. In their initial
filing, German lawyers will include the basic elements of their proof
insofar as they are known-for example, hospital records and names
of witnesses. The lawyer is not expected to have done much
investigation; investigation is the job of the judge. '48 The judge
examines the documents submitted by both sides, requests further
evidence, and may schedule the first of many hearings. This
procedure allows many cases to be resolved quickly. In any event, it
gives the judge an immediate sense of the issues to be resolved. If an
issue requires expertise, the judge-not the parties-will arrange for
and hire the necessary experts. 149
Most inquisitorial systems have checks and balances to ensure
that the process remains fair and unbiased. It is the parties who
generally suggest areas of fact investigation, and many systems have
at least one level of de novo review. "' Nevertheless, the judge plays
a much larger role in developing the case, both factually and legally.
Accordingly, at least in theory, a litigant's presentation and advocacy
skills matter significantly less in a civil law system. ' In addition,
since civil law courts do not generally consider case law precedent,
litigants have less of a need for expertise in finding and citing such
precedent. 52
Some civil law systems have taken the inquisitorial model
further, in part to further alleviate the need for attorneys. "' Judges
in Chile, for example, are empowered to add documents to the
record, order sworn statements by parties on central questions of fact,
146. Sward, supra note 10, at 313.
147. John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CIE. L. REV. 823, 827
(1985).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Sward, supra note 10, at 314.
151. See John Samuel Scott, Access to Civil Justice in the United States and the Soviet Union:
A ComparativeAnalysis, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 215, 243 (1986).
152. See id.
153. DAGMAR SOENNECKEN, "JUSTICE SERVED?" LEGAL AID AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS
FOR REFUGEES IN ACOMPARATIVE CONTEXT 8 (2004).
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order expert testimony, personally inspect property at issue, recall
witnesses for the purpose of clarifying earlier testimony, and take
any other steps necessary to "better resolve the controversy." 154
Presumably, this final catchall authority permits a Chilean judge to
call a potential witness apparent in the record but not called by either
party. 155
B. Problems with Access andAttempted Remedies
Foreign jurisdictions face many of the same problems that arise
in the United States with regard to access to justice. To address
problems related to the lack of representation, jurisdictions
worldwide have used a variety of approaches, including attempts to
reduce the cost of engaging an attorney, constitutionally or statutorily
mandating a right to counsel, providing alternative forums for
resolving disputes, and seeking to improve the public's legal literacy.
To increase access to attorneys, most jurisdictions outside the
United States set upper limits on the fees attorneys may charge for
their services. 156 Germany, for example, has established a statutory
fee schedule, making any deviation in excess of the prescribed
amount illegal and therefore void. ' Under standard economic
theory, however, price controls should, in the long run, reduce the
supply of attorneys by making the profession less attractive to
existing practitioners and new entrants alike. If so, this approach
may actually exacerbate perceived shortages of legal professionals.
Permitting attorneys to self-fund their services by means of
contingency fee arrangements represents an alternative way of
expanding attorney access without negatively affecting the supply of
lawyers. Most nations currently prohibit this practice due to a
perception that contingency fee arrangements encourage litigation. 158
From an American perspective, contingency fee arrangements might
154. Richard B. Cappalli, Comparative South American Civil Procedure: A Chilean
Perspective, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 239, 255-56 (1990). Notably, however, these
judicial powers may be underutilized due to the limited resources and time constraints faced by
judges.
155. Id.
156. Lua KamdI Yuille, No One's Perfect (Not Even Close): ReevaluatingAccess to Justice in
the United States and Western Europe, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 863, 909 (2004).
157. Id.
158. George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation Funding Industry: How Much
Justice Can You Afford?, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 805, 808 (2001).
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be viewed as a concern because they permit too much access to
justice. Nevertheless, if a trend exists, it probably favors the
contingency fee. The United Kingdom entirely barred such a
payment arrangement until 2000, when it instituted a variant known
as the conditional fee. 159 Belgium 160 and Lithuania 161 also recently
allowed the use of contingency fee agreements or something similar,
bringing the total number of nations permitting such arrangements to
a dozen. 162
Legal insurance is another funding mechanism in widespread
use in several foreign jurisdictions. 163 Unlike the prepaid legal plans
that are typical in the United States, subscribers of these insurance
plans receive any and all needed legal services, usually by an
appointed lawyer, on an annual basis. 164 Such plans are common in
Germany, Sweden, and France, 165 with more than 40 percent of
households receiving coverage in Germany, the largest market. 166
Notably, the involvement of insurance companies helps to control
costs for the represented litigants, 167 which may place downward
pressure on attorney fees in general. Such plans do not, however,
directly increase access to attorneys for the indigent because the poor
are less likely to have the disposable income to purchase insurance
policies in the first place. 168
A salient feature of many foreign legal systems is the
recognition that severe injustice may occur-both in civil
proceedings and criminal trials-if litigants are denied access to
legal counsel. Some countries, such as Nigeria, resolve this issue by
159. Tamara Goriely, The English Approach to Access to Justice 7-8, Dec. 11, 2002,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/EnglandWhales.pdf.
160. Winand Emons, Conditional Versus Contingent Fees, 59 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 89,
(2007), availableat http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/59/1/89.
161. Linas Sesickas, Access to Justice in Lithuania, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 159 (2000).
162. The others, identified in a 2004 study, are Australia, Brazil, Canada, the Dominican
Republic, France, Greece, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and, of course, the United States. See
HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 258-59 (2004).

163.
UK, 25
164.
165.
166.
167.

John Flood & Avis Whyte, What's Wrong with Legal Aid? Lessons from Outside the
CIV. JUST. Q. 80, 92-93 (2006).
See id.
Yuille, supra note 156, at 909.
Flood & Whyte, supra note 163, at 93.
Id. at 92.

168. Id. at 93.
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allowing litigants, criminal or civil, to pursue or defend claims only
through an attorney, and are provided an attorney. 169 In many other
countries, citizens who are unable to afford an attorney are
guaranteed legal aid for civil claims by constitutional provision or
statute. While perhaps a majority of countries recognize a right to
legal aid to defend severe criminal charges, the constitutions of only
a handful of countries-among them Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and South Africa-contain provisions explicitly extending
this right to civil cases. 170 In several other countries, notably
Switzerland and Germany, the highest court has held that
constitutional equal protection or due process provisions-expressed
in language similar to the comparable clauses in the U.S.
Constitution-guarantee indigent litigants in civil cases the right to
free counsel. 171
Some Western European nations, including the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, and Romania, that do not provide civil litigants a
constitutional right to counsel do provide such a right by statute, 172 at
least in some contexts. 173 A decision by the European Court of
Human Rights bolsters this right for indigent civil litigants in
countries that are signatories to the European Convention on Human
Rights, which include all the states of Western Europe. 174 In Airey v.
Ireland,17' a woman sought legal aid to secure representation to
obtain a legal separation from her abusive spouse. 176 In essence, the
court held that a state may be compelled to provide legal services to
indigents in civil actions that implicate either complex legal or
procedural issues1 77 in order to guarantee every individual an
169. See Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 103, 135 (2002).
170. See, e.g., Symposium, Access to Justice:Does It Exist in Civil Cases?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 455, 459 (2004) (discussing Italy, the Netherlands, and South Africa); Yuille, supra note
156, at 879-80 (discussing Portugal and Spain); see also Keith S. Rosenn, Civil Procedure in
Brazil, 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 487 (1986).
171. Johnson, supra note 37, at S89-S90.
172. Yuille, supra note 156, at 881-82.
173. See Sesickas, supra note 161, at 179-80.
174. See Yuille, supra note 156, at 882-84 & n.105.
175. 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4 (Ser. A) (1979).
176. Id. at 3-4.
177. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon's Trumpet Sound a New Melody? The Globalization
of Constitutional Values and Its Implicationsfor a Right to Equal Justice in Civil Cases, 2
SEAT-TLE J. SOC. JUST. 201, 217-18 (2003).
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"effective right" to court access to defend his or her civil rights and
obligations, as the language of the convention requires. 1' The court
recognized that simplifying procedural rules in local courts might
represent an alternative means to achieve this same objective. "'
A constitutional or statutory guarantee places the financial
burden of providing legal services to the indigent squarely on the
Many countries devote
shoulders of the public institutions.
substantially greater resources to support legal aid for indigent civil
litigants than does the United States. One study compared legal aid
expenditures in the United States with those in Germany, France,
Australia, Canada, England and Wales, the Netherlands, and New
Zealand. 180 The study found that each of the comparison nations
spent, as a percentage of gross national product, between 2.5 times
and 23.5 times the budget of the Legal Service Corporation, the
principal provider of public legal aid in the United States. 181
Legal aid in Canada and Australia is provided at the provincial
or state level, respectively, but the regional agencies cited in the
study spent more than four times the comparable figure for the
United States. 182 The trend in most countries in the United Kingdom
and Northern Europe, moreover, is to increase public spending on
civil legal services. 183 By contrast, as of 2000, spending for this
purpose in the United States had yet to recover fully from the deep
cuts of the early 1980s. ' The nations with the best legal aid
programs in terms of coverage are the Netherlands, Finland, and
Sweden, which extend legal aid eligibility to more than 45 percent,
50 percent, and 80 percent of their populations, respectively. 185
It should come as no surprise that constitutional and statutory
commitments to provide free legal services to the poor are not
always supported by sufficient government funding. Colombia falls
well short of the ideal of full coverage expressed in its constitution,

178. PUB. INTEREST LAW INITIATIVE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES, PURSUING THE PUBLIC

INTEREST 221 (Edwin Rekosh et al. eds., 2001).
179. See Johnson, supra note 177, at 218.
180. See Flood & Whyte, supra note 163, at 84.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 83, 87.
184. Id. at 94.
185. Yuille, supra note 156, at 888-89.
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largely reflecting the nation's laissez-faire approach to the problem
and consequent failure to implement any public institutional
mechanisms. 186 Venezuelan law mandates appointment of a free
attorney to individuals who lack representation but makes no
provision for payment, instead unsuccessfully depending on pro
bono services from the legal community. 187
Even where the right to counsel is granted statutorily,
legislatures may limit its availability. Applicants for legal aid must
generally pass a means test; some nations also impose a precondition
that the applicant's claim or defense be meritorious. 188 In addition, a
number of legal aid programs limit coverage to specific types of civil
claims. England, for example, does not provide legal aid for
personal injury plaintiffs, 189 though, as noted above, that country
now permits a form of contingency fee arrangement to help fill the
resulting void. 190 In certain foreign legal systems, cost-shifting rules
require the loser in a lawsuit to pay the winner's legal expenses. 191
Pro se litigants, however, are generally only able to recover actual
expenses of litigation and not the cost of their time in defending or
pursuing their cases. 192 Accordingly, lower-income individuals may
be reticent to pursue even robust claims when the likely recovery
does not include any forgone income. To solve this problem,
England and, more recently, Canada have recognized a right for lay
litigants to recover the opportunity costs of self-representation. 193
Another solution has been to establish less formal forums
designed to be user-friendly and thus more accessible to the
unrepresented litigant. Such forums are often created to handle the
kinds of matters in which parties are more likely to proceed without
legal representation, such as family matters or disputes in which the

186. See Cappalli, supra note 154, at 245.
187. Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36
VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 207 n.174 (1995).
188. See, e.g., David McQuoid-Mason, Access to Justice in South Africa, 17 WINDSOR Y.B.
ACCESS JUST. 230, 239 (1999).
189. Goreily, supra note 159, at 7.
190. See id.
191. Swan, supra note 158, at 814.
192. Robert Flannigan, Costs for Self-Represented Litigants: Principles, Interests and
Agendas, 33 ADVOCATES' Q. 447,448 (2007).
193. Seeid. at461.
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amount in controversy is small. 194 Indeed, the small claims courts of
attorneys
many jurisdictions-including South Africa 95-forbid
from appearing on behalf of parties. Lawyers in England are not
entirely barred from appearing in small claims courts, but the
statutory legal-fee limitations discourage them from actively seeking
such engagements. 196

In addition to small claims courts, England offers an alternative
dispute resolution forum: the tribunal. English tribunals began as
private institutions before being given official status by an act of
Parliament in the mid-1950s. '9 Notably, under the act, each tribunal
has the power to write its own code of procedure. 198 Two of the
stated objectives of the tribunals are to minimize costs and to provide
an accessible forum. 9 The informality and low cost of tribunal
proceedings are thought to expand access to the less well-off and to
pro se litigants in general. 200

Community courts, often overseen by community members
rather than legal professionals or jurists, represent another dispute
In several post-colonial countries,
resolution alternative. 201
community courts were created to empower indigenous populations
as well as to provide a more accessible forum. 202 Granting control of
the judiciary to the community should theoretically expand local
access to justice, but the experience in the post-colonial world has
been mixed, with some village courts in Zimbabwe and Mozambique
periodically devolving into illegitimacy. 203 Attempts in India to
revive a traditional legal institution known as the "Panchayat" have
suffered a similar fate in some communities. 204

194.
195.
196.
197.

See McQuoid-Mason, supra note 188, at 244.
Id. at 245.
Buxton, supra note 169, at 134-35.
Id. at 126.

198. Id.
199. Id. at 127.
200. See id.
201. See McQuoid-Mason, supra note 188, at 244.
202. Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, "Breadfor the Poor": Access to Justice and the
Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 793-95 (2004).
203. See McQuoid-Mason, supra note 188, at 244.
204. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 202, at 793; see also Rohit Mullick & Neelam Raaj,
Panchayats Turn into Kangaroo Courts, TIMES INDIA, Sept. 9, 2007.
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India has had greater success with an innovative judicial forum
known as the "Lok Adalat." 205 Lok Adalats are intended to provide a
no-cost forum to resolve disputes through conciliation and
compromise.206 In essence, they provide court-sanctioned mediation
services with a twist: the principal players are not "eminent judges
and prominent lawyers, but district judges, social workers, and local
advocates," which may help foster compromise. 207 Notably, the
structure is intended to be accessible to pro se litigants-indeed,
presiding judges in some Lok Adalats are openly hostile to
attorneys.208 In a country with a legal system characterized by
inordinate delay and extortionate costs, Lok Adalats provide an
official process by which claimants can secure their rights quickly
and inexpensively, although compromise is generally required in
return. 209
Notably, public sector agencies and government
departments have adopted similar mechanisms to resolve minor
disputes with consumers and other matters. 210
To a certain extent, the emergence of the Lok Adalat is part of a
larger global movement favoring alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. Before proceeding to court in Norway, for example,
almost all litigants in civil suits must first submit to mandatory
mediation proceedings overseen by justices of the peace drawn from
In Latin America,
the citizenry rather than the judiciary.211
mediation and arbitration have also increased access to justice,
especially for the poor, as an alternative to formal court systems
plagued by corruption and delays. 212
A lack of knowledge of legal rights and options is often a
significant impediment to access to justice. To rectify this problem,
some governments have initiated basic legal literacy programs.213
India, for one, is in the midst of a massive five-year legal literacy
205. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 202, at 799 (describing the incredibly high volume
of cases that have been resolved by Lok Adalats in the relatively short time they have existed).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 800.
208. Id. at815-16.
209. Id. at 808.
210. Id. at 800-01.
211. Buxton, supra note 169, at 128.
212. Dakolias, supra note 187, at 200.
213. Frank S. Bloch, Access to Justice and the Global Clinical Movement, 28 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 111, 119 (2008).
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campaign, while South Africa's local justice centers are specifically
tasked with the responsibility of educating the public. Chile has
located legal informational centers in the most impoverished areas of
the country. 214
C. The Role of Judges in Civil Law Systems

Civil law judges are, first and foremost, judges. They are
generally educated separately from lawyers. They are usually part of
the civic government and are appointed in a manner consistent with
civil service employment. Civil law judges will typically begin their
careers in the lower courts and work their way up to a leadership role
or a higher court.2 5 In consequence, the sporting theory of justice
beloved by American lawyers is much less likely to affect judicial
behavior in civil law countries.
Judges in civil law jurisdictions generally assume a more active
role when overseeing cases than their counterparts in common law
jurisdictions. As has been noted, in an inquisitorial system, the judge
actively supervises the gathering of evidence. After a case is filed,
the judge examines any documents the parties have submitted,
requests further evidence, and undertakes investigatory hearings. 216
If an issue requires expertise, it is the judge that hires the experts. In
sum, in civil law systems, the judge is trained to, expected to, and
does play a substantial role in developing the case. Accordingly,
unrepresented litigants should be at less of a disadvantage than they
are in adversarial courts.
This also means, however, that more judges are required. As a
result, the number of judges in civil law countries is generally much
214. Michael A. Samway, Access to Justice: A Study of Legal Assistance Programsfor the
Poor in Santiago, Chile, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 347, 365 (1996).
215. RUDOLF SCHLESINGER, ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 180-82 (5th ed. 1988).
216. There is a split among civil law countries as to how much of a proceeding may be oral as
opposed to written. Most European countries have a strong preference for oral and public
hearings. Id. at 417. This is a reaction to the medieval system, which was in place from the
thirteenth to eighteenth centuries, where proceedings were conducted in secret and all evidence
had to be reduced to writing. See id.; see also ENGELMANN-MILLAR, A HISTORY OF
CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 457-58 (1927). In Spain and Latin America, much of the
proceedings are still similar to the medieval processes, especially as to the use of only written
evidence. MARTHA FIELD & WILLIAM FISHER, LEGAL REFORM IN CENTRAL AMERICA: DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND PROPERTY SYSTEMS 22-23 (Harvard Univ. Press 2001). This is changing
slowly. Cavise, supra note 145, at 786. The movement towards "oralidad" (or oral trials) will
bring with it many challenges. It will be interesting to see whether Latin America can add an oral
tradition without adding the procedural apparatus of an adversary system.
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higher per lawyer or per capita than in the United States. 27
Germany, for example, has nine times more judges per capita than
the United States. 218
A cadre of judges in India adopted an even more proactive role
in the early 1980s in an attempt to implement theretofore unfulfilled
constitutional promises of justice. 219 The group implemented a
number of initiatives that would likely be viewed as radical in the
United States, going as far as to relax standing rules and assume
jurisdiction over matters raised by third parties, with the goal to
protect excluded and powerless groups. 22'
Taking a similar
approach, France and Germany have recently implemented more
permissive rules for standing to allow third parties to bring actions
when usual standing rules appear to be counterproductive. 221
In a somewhat less dramatic exertion of judicial power, judges
in Japan-a mixed legal system with elements adopted from both the
U.S. common law system and the German civil law system-are
generally "expected to intervene and assist pro se litigants." 222 The
Japanese system permits claimants to make their initial pleading in a
relatively informal oral manner; they are required to convey only the
factual circumstances of their case. The court then confirms that all
of the necessary legal elements are present to state a cause of
action. 223 Both measures are tailored to aid the pro se litigant.
IV.

WHAT THE AMERICAN SYSTEM CAN
FROM CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS

BORROW

It is unrealistic to ask that American courts abandon a system of
adjudication that works well, more or less, for parties with
representation simply because significant portions of the American
polity cannot afford such representation. Nor would such wholesale
change necessarily be desirable. Nevertheless, a number of concrete
steps suggested by the civil law system may merit consideration.
217. Schlesinger, supra note 215, at 183 & n.13.
218. Interview with Dr. Thomas Lundmark, Professor of Law, Westfilische WilhelmsUniversitit Miinster (Dec. 2008).
219. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 202, at 795.
220. Id.
221. Yuille, supra note 156, at 910.
222. Buxton, supra note 169, at 137.
223. Id. at 141.
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First, American law schools commonly treat the role of judges
as referees as if that role is written in stone. The Langdellian focus
on appellate opinions relegates the trial process to relative obscurity.
Law becomes an intellectual game-perhaps even, in Robert Bork's
immortal words, an "intellectual feast"-and not the life-and-death
matter it actually is for many litigants. Since most judges in the
United States are trained as lawyers, it might make sense to rethink
the role of law schools in that training process. During the first year,
when law students are inculcated in the values of our system, we
might at least talk about the range of ways disputes can be resolved
and the different roles lawyers and judges can play in different
dispute resolution processes. Many law schools offer courses on
lawyering; we might perhaps consider offering courses on judging.
It may also be useful to expose students more systematically to the
problems faced by unrepresented litigants. Mandatory pro bono
service requirements are sometimes justified on this basis.
Second, when training newly appointed or elected judges, we
should deemphasize the sporting theory of justice and reemphasize
the importance of justice itself. Many, if not most, judges appointed
in the United States were excellent advocates-excellent players of
the sport of law, if you will. 224 Like other human beings, judges tend
to place a high value on things they themselves are good at-in this
case, the procedural give and take of trial. To some extent, therefore,
judges need to unlearn the skills and values that made them good
lawyers. Judicial training should focus on reorienting judges from
the practice of law to the practice of dispensing justice.
Third, we should consider creating tracks in courts of general
jurisdiction for unrepresented litigants, and we should identify courts
of special jurisdiction in which lack of representation is particularly
common. Judges in such tracks and courts should receive special
training in dealing with the problems of the unrepresented. They
should also be granted greater leeway by courts of review to exercise
discretion and initiative in pursuit of just outcomes; they should not
be held to the same passive ideal to which judges presiding over
contests between fully represented parties are held.

224. See National Association of Former United States Attorneys,
www.nafusa.org/directory-home.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).

Directory, http://
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Fourth, we should rethink the Model Code, at least as applied to
such tracks and courts. Rule 2.9 of the Model Code, which generally
characterizes independent investigation as ex parte communication
per se, is particularly problematic. As noted above, Rule 2.9
substantially relaxes prohibitions on such ex parte communications
in nontraditional dispute resolution forums, as authorized by law: "A
judge may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications
expressly authorized by law, such as when serving on therapeutic or
problem-solving courts, mental health courts, or drug courts. In this
capacity, judges may assume a more interactive role with parties,
treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and
others." 225 If the rules of the Model Code themselves are not to be
changed, legislation should be considered that will allow greater
freedom to judges in such tracks or courts to take affirmative steps to
ensure that all relevant facts are available and all relevant law has
been considered before judgment is entered.
Fifth, such tracks and courts need substantially greater
funding. 226 If we want judges to be more active and involved in
seeking the truth, we need to reduce judicial caseloads. Much has
been written about the high caseloads of social workers and public
defenders; there has been remarkably little public outcry about
judicial caseloads. At the moment, of course, the trend is moving in
the other direction. In Minnesota, for example, the governor has
proposed at least a 5 percent cut in funding for the courts, which
have already been underfunded for years. 227 Under this budgetcutting plan, "Legal Aid would lose $1 million in one-time funding,
plus 5 percent of its base state funding, or about another
$600,000." 228
Finally, we should work with trial judges to develop clearer
rules and guidelines for judges in the assistance of self-represented
litigants, and we should continue experimenting with alternative

225. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9 cmt. 4 (2007).
226. Edward A. Adams, Economy & Politics Threaten State Courts, ABA House Told, ABA
JOURNAL, Feb. 16, 2006, available at http://abajournal.com/news/economy-politicsthreaten_
statecourts aba housetold/ ("Massive state budget shortfalls threaten the ability of courts to
continue to operate").
227. Mark A. Cohen, Will Justice Crumble?, MINN. LAWYER, Jan. 30, 2009.
228. Id.
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dispute resolution forums where judges can be given greater freedom
to be active in the search for truth and justice.
V. CONCLUSION

Scholars who worry about access to justice can easily become
reflexively pessimistic. It is important, however, to not fall into the
trap of thinking that change is impossible. The norms of the sporting
theory of justice may make change difficult. Behaviors nevertheless
can and do evolve. An example of the possibility of radical cultural
change is recounted by Malcolm Gladwell in his new book, Outliers,
in which he explained the recent transformation of the Korean airline
industry.229 In 1997, Korean airlines had a terrible record of
crashes. 230 In his exhaustive account of an accident that took place
that year, Gladwell noted that hierarchical cultural norms impeded
the ability of the pilots to communicate. To solve this aspect of the
problem, Korean Air brought in David Greenberg, a long-time
American airline executive, to work on flight operations. As
Gladwell explained it,
Greenberg wanted to give his pilots an alternate identity.
Their problem was that they were trapped in roles dictated
by the heavy weight of their country's cultural legacy.
They needed an opportunity to step outside those roles
when they sat in the cockpit, and language was the key to
that transformation. In English, they would be free of the
sharply defined gradients of Korean hierarchy: formal
deference, informal deference, blunt, familiar, intimate and
plain. Instead, the pilots could participate in a culture and
language with a very different legacy. 231
I do not suggest that American judges begin speaking French. I do
suggest, however, that cultural change is possible, even in the face of
deeply ingrained patterns of behavior.
Solving the problems of unrepresented litigants in American
courts will likely require such cultural change. Unlike the civil law
system, where the judge takes an active role in the investigation of
facts and in the resolution of the case, the American adversary
229. MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS 179-82 (2008).
230. Id.
231. Id. at219.
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system calls for the judge to play a largely passive role, serving
primarily as referee. 232 Many judges have internalized this role so
deeply that they view it as natural and inevitable. It is neither.
Judges need to be reminded that their job ultimately is to administer
justice.

232. Roberta K. Flowers, An Unholy Alliance: The Ex ParteRelationship Between the Judge
and the Prosecutor,79 NEB. L. REv. 251, 264 (2000).

